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Abstract
Thequestfor European Securityinvolves
the protracted interaction of interna-
tiontUdiplomacy, wartmddomesticpoli-
tics. This articleshowshowKosovo isan
interplay of aU these components.
KosovoisaœseinwhichNATObelieoes
thilt it is strengthening its position and
collective security by solidifying the re-
cent Enlargement Process to attain
Collective Security-diplomatically,or-
ganizationallyand through theMilitary
of CfTF. The priet is over Dne!million
displaced persans (refugees), andtherisk
of e71dangering European Security
through thefailure ofthe European Dis-
armament process as indicate4 by the
failure ofthe Russian Duma even to de-
bateSTARTII/Ill.
Résumé
La recherche d'une sécurité eutopéenne
implique l'interactionàlong termede la
diplomatie internationale, de la guerre,
etdes politiquesdomestiques. Leprésent
articlemontrecomment le I<osaooestun
point nodal, où ces différents éléments
sont en contact. Le Kosovo est un cas de
figure dans lequell'OTANCTcnt renfor-
cersa position et la sécuritécollectiveen
solidifiant le récent Enlatgement
Process to attainCollective$ecurity,
et ce, diplomatiquement, orga~i-sation­
nellement,etVÜlles structùresmüitaires
.du CfTF. Leprixàpayerestal()TS le sui-
vant: plus d'un million de personnes
déplacées (réfugiés), et une menace cer-
taine sur la sécurité eur~ne par la
faillite du processus de désarmement
européen,patenteetmanifest~dansl'in-
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WhyKosovo?
.Glen Segell
capacitédela Doumarusséàsimplement
entamer ledébat sur les accords START
Ilet Ill.
ThechoicebyNATOtoundertakemili-
tary action in Kosovo is unique, in sin-
gling out one specifie humanitarian
crisis in which to intervene apparently
without careful thought about the con-
sequences-specifically, the ramifica-
tion ofrefugees.
The situation in former Yugoslavia,
as in almost ail International crises,
generates humanitarian problems and
some form of refugee consequence.
NATOactioninKosovohas aggravated
the refugee problemthere to the extent
that one can say there is no longer a
refugeeorethnicprobleminKosovo-it
isnowintheneighbouringstatesofthe
EuropeanUnion,whohavetodealwith,
accormngtoestimates,overonemillion
displacedpersans.Vaguereferences to
the retum of these persons to their
homes before winter can hardly bebe-
lieved!
It ail started when the United States
and its allies geared up for military
strikes onOctober11,1998 againstSer-
biantargets as a reaction ta the "mass
graves incidents" inKosovoofSeptem-
ber 1998. Such incidents were not new,
but came at a time when NATO was
tryingtounifyafteritsrecentexpansion
to indude Poland, the Czech State and
Hungary,whilealsoattempting to find
ameanstotesttheStrategyofCombined
and Joint Task Forces (CJ1F). Kosovo
appeared to offer a relatively easy and
low riskmilitaryandpoliticalmeansof
tryingoutboththeexpanded organiza-
tionandCjTF.NAlOhadnootherinter-
estinKosovo-thehumanitariancrlses
was a U casus belli" thatcouldhavebeen
ignored, as it has been for years in
Kosovoandotherregionsofthe former
Yugoslavia.
However,fromtheonset,thepossible
ramificationsofrefugeesand theuse of
ground forces werenotconsidered. No
plansweremadetoairlifttroopsin,orto
prepare for a mass refugee problem. It
wastobeanaircampaign similar to the
oneconductedafewmonthspreviously
against Iraq! Themainmilitaryactivity
would be conducted by the United
States. Other NATO members would
supplytokenmilitaryforces andwould
support the action through political
consensus in NATO organizational
meetings inthecomfortofboard rooms
in Brussels.
The Kosovar action was therefore
aimedatone(andonlyone)goalofEu-
ropean Security: keeping the new and
oldmembersofNATOunified.No-one
even thought of listening to Russia or
considered other aspects of European
Security, such as the process of disar-
marnent.
Had anyone listened, they would
haveheard PavelFelgenhauer,defense
and security editor for the newspaper
Segodnya, stating about NATO action
that "Communists and nationalists
willcryoutthatMotherR~ssiaisnext in
line for attack and many Russians,
stunned by the collapse of their West-
em-oriented quasi-market economy,
will believe them."l They also would
have been able to leam about ethnie
problems and refugees from Russia's
failed military action in Chechnya.
This was not rhetoric, for reports
show that Russian military and politi-
calleaderswerethreateningtoseverties
with NATO; to send peacekeeping
troops to the Yugoslav Federation to
prevent a NATO attack; to unilaterally
endanarmsembargoagainsttheYugo-
slav Federation; and to further stan
nuclear arms reduction agreements
with the United States.
The initiative for suchactivitiescame
fromtheStateDurna, thelowerhouse of
the Russianparliament,whichhas ona
numberofoccasionsthreatenedtobreak
ties with NATO. Ultranationalist
groups like the Union of Officers are
signing up volunteers to fight for Ser-
19
bia.2 This is all disturbing, but nothing the 
West has not heard about beforeand so it 
was ignored by NATO planners.  
In October 1998, the sabre-rattling was 
accompanied by a round of telephone calls 
to Western leaders by President Boris N. 
Yeltsin and Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov, as well as some urgent shuttle 
diplomacy by Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov. Russia expressed its objection to 
the violent methods used by Milosevic to 
crack down on separatist Kosovo, but 
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would be considered an "illegal act of 
aggression." In a unanimous resolution, 
the State Duma said it would review all 
agreements between NATO and Russia if 
the Western alliance were to opt for the 
use of force against Yugoslavia. Such a 
decision "may cause irreparable harm to 
the international security system fixed in 
the UN Charter," the resolution stated.s  
The Communist leader of the State 
Duma (Russia's lower house of parlia-
ment) speaker Gennady Seleznyov, 
warned that "if a single bomb or rocket is 
dropped in Serbia, the Yugoslav army 
will retaliate ... and this can trigger a full-
scale war." He also stressed that if the 
United States initiates military action, 
U.S. officials "may say goodbye to 
ratification of the START II treaty," and 
added, "We were moving toward ratify-
ing it. IfNA TO inflicts this blow against 
Kosovo, it will all be thrown back. It will 
all be forgotten.,,6  
Itwas not immediately clear whether 
Seleznyov had coordinated his comments 
with Yeltsin or with Russian Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov, both of 
whom favour ratification of START II 
but oppose military action against Yu-
goslavia.  
An explanation offered for such terse 
statements is the nature of Russian do-
mestic politics. Russia already has a 
province, Chechnya, that won de facto 
independence after Moscow's twenty-
month campaign failed to crush a sepa-
ratist rebellion. Ethnic tensions are strong 
in Chechnya's neighbouring province, 
Dagestan, and separatist moods run high 
in the Volga region of Tatarstan. u.s. 
specialists say Russia is less worried 
about the precedent that NATO 
intervention would set for Chechnya or 
Tatarstan, than it is by the idea that the 
West can do whatever it chooses in 
Moscow's backyard. "The main reason 
the Russians oppose [NATO strikes] is 
psychological," said Kurt Bassuener, 
director of the Balkan Action Council in 
Washington. "They don't want to be seen 
as being an adjunctto the West. It's a 
cost-free way for Russia to differentiate 
itself."7  
Months into the military action against 
Kosovo, some of these warnings  
 
have come true: Russia is still stalling 
with the Disarmament Process-Europe is 
no further advanced in attaining security 
than it was prior to military action in 
Kosovo. Furthermore, Europe is now 
facing a refugee crisis-the largest since 
the end of World War II.  
The lesson of the Cold War is clear for 
of today' s Cold Diplomacy-Do not ig-
nore the obvious! For NATO, this means 
that it is now involved in a protracted 
military air campaign against a country 
which does not even have an Embassy in 
Washington, o.c. It means that the 
Disarmament process of START II/III 
and beyond has been set back indefi-
nitely, and that the economic and social 
structures of the European Union are 
facing the arduous task of dealing with a 
mass refugee crisis. Have the goals of 
NATO action been achieved-NATO 
enlargement unification and CJTF? The 
answer is NO-the new NATO members 
have not contributed any air forces, and 
so far the only forces used have been air 
power; hence, the CJTF has yet to be 
tested. Even if NATO proves to be suc-
cessful in CJTF and in its enlargement, 
the costs remain-including that of over 
one million displaced persons! ••  
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